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PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT DURING ARMED
CONFLICT
Roman Reyhani'
I. INTRODUCTION

The environment is generally not considered a high priority during
armed conflict. International law, however, has provided a number of
protections for the environment in times of war. This article addresses the
various Conventions and Protocols that shield the environment from
destructive weapons and discusses the differences between them. The
article also considers national and international enforcement and
implementation measures enacted to uphold those protections.
The International Court of Justice ("ICJ") has declared that the
"environment is under daily threat" and that it "is not an abstraction but
represents the living space, the quality of life and the very health of human
beings, including generations unborn."I It went on to state that,
The existence of the general obligation of States to ensure
that activities within their jurisdiction and control respect
the environment of other States or of areas beyond national
control is now part of the corpus of international law
relating to the environment. 2
The impact of climate change has placed increased emphasis on
environmental protection. In the highly charged theatre of armed conflict,
limitations have been created to stabilize our wheezing climate. According
to the ICJ in the Nuclear Weapons Case, "[s]tates must take environmental
The author would like to express his thanks to Professor Nico Schrijver of Leiden
University for his assistance with this article.
' International Court of Justice, Advisory Opinion: Legality of the Threat or Use of
Nuclear Weapons (July 8, 1996), availableat http://www.icjcij.org/icjwww/icases/iunan/iunanframe.htm (follow "Advisory Opinion" hyperlinks)
thereinafter Advisory Opinion].
Id.
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considerations into account when assessing what is necessary and
proportionate in the pursuit of legitimate military objectives." 3 In light of
this judgement, this article will outline the extent to which the
environment is protected during armed conflict by direct and indirect laws,
as well as their implementing mechanisms. Although this article will
approach the issue primarily from the standpoint of environmental law,
regard will also be given to the relevant principles of international
humanitarian law.
II. DIRECT TREATY LAW

A. The ENMOD Convention 1976
The Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other
Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques ("ENMOD
Convention") was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in
1976 and opened for signature in 1977.4 This treaty prohibits the use of
environmental modification techniques as a weapon during a conflict.5 It
was inspired by the outrage over U.S. defoliation campaigns in the
Vietnam War and the fear that technology was reaching a point where it
could be used to unleash disastrous environmental changes as a weapon in
war. Article I of the Convention provides:
Each State Party to this Convention undertakes not to
engage in military or any other hostile use of the
environmental modification techniques having widespread,
long-lasting or severe effects as the means of destruction,
damage or injury to any other State Party.
Advisory Opinion, supra note 1. This case involved the ICJ weighing the compatibility
of the threat or use of nuclear weapons against the various relevant principles and rules of
international law.
4 Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental
Modification Techniques, G.A. Res. 31/72, art. 1, $ 1, Annex, U.N. GAOR, 31st Sess.,
Supp. No. 39, U.N. Doc A/31/39 (Dec. 10, 1976) [hereinafter ENMOD Convention].
5
Id.
Id.
3

7id.
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This Article also requires that Parties undertake "not to assist, encourage
or induce any State, proup of States or international organization to engage
in [such] activities."
Article II stipulates that the term 'environmental modification
techniques' used in Article I:
refers to any technique for changing - through the
deliberate manipulation of natural processes - the
dynamics, composition or structure of the Earth, including
its biota, lithosphere, hydrosphere and atmosphere, or of
outer space. 9
This Article includes a number of important elements. First, the action
requires intent.1o Second, it must manipulate a natural process.' A nonexhaustive list illustrating the types of natural processes covered by this
treaty were outlined in an Understanding that was attached to the ENMOD
Convention.12 These include "earthquakes; tsunamis; an upset in the
ecological balance of a region; changes in weather patterns (clouds,
precipitation, cyclones of various types and tornadic storms); changes in
climate patterns; changes in ocean currents; changes in the state of the
ozone layer; and changes in the state of the ionosphere." 3
Third, Article I contains the threshold criteria, requiring that the
alleged violation be either "widespread, long-lasting or severe.", If one of
these requirements is met, the military necessity exception is not
available.1

'Id. 2.
9 Id.

10

YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL
ARMED CONFLICT 178 (Cambridge University Press 2004).

1"Id.
12 id

13

id.

14ENMOD

Convention, supra note 4, 1.
" Susana Pimiento Chamorro & Edward Hammond, Addressing Environmental
Modification in Post-Cold War Conflict, in THE SUNSHINE PROJECT (2001), availableat
http://www.edmonds-institute.org/pimiento.html.

325

Mo. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REv., Vol. 14, No. 2
Fourth, Article I also requires that the environmental modification
technique be for military or hostile purposes.16 Peaceful and non-hostile
uses are expressly outside the scope of the Convention. 17 Provided no
damage or injury results from such techniques, it would be permitted, for
example, to initiate fog dispersal in order to facilitate aircraft takeoffs and
landings or clear enemy targets from an area to be bombed. 1
It is generally undisputed that the Convention applies to armed
conflicts between state parties, however, its application to the situation in
which a state party attacks a non-state party is still unclear. Various
interpretations exist, including the restrictive view that the ENMOD's
applicability should only be amongst state parties to provide an incentive
for ratification and avoid the situation in which a state would gain the
benefits of ENMOD without having to abide by its rules.19 In support of
this view proposals were rejected during drafting that the Convention
apply as an erga omnes obligation. 20 An alternative interpretation allows
limited protection to non-state parties in situations where they have been
encouraged or assisted by state parties to undertake actions that contravene
the Convention. Such a situation would be a violation of Article 1(2) of the
Convention and could result in an action against the state party. Areas
outside the jurisdiction of all states, such as the high seas, are generally
considered to be outside the scope of the Convention unless there is an
effect on a state party's activities (e.g., shipping).2 1
The ENMOD provisions have likely reached the status of
customary international law.22 This law is made up of two elements: state
practice and the conviction that such practice reflects, or amounts to, law
or is required by social, economic or political exigencies. 23 The military
manuals of some states, including Israel, South Korea, and New Zealand,

1

Id.

17 ENMOD

Convention, supra note 4, art. 3,

1.

" J. A. Cohan, Modes of Warfare and Evolving Standards ofEnvironmentalProtection
under the InternationalLaw of War, 15 FLA. J. INT'L L. 481, 520-21 (2003).
19
See Chamorro & Hammond, supranote 15; DINSTEIN, supranote 10.
20 See DINSTEIN, supra note 10, at 180-8
1.
21 Id
22
at 181.
23 ANTONIo CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 156 (Oxford University Press, 2d ed. 2005).
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indicate that it applies to state parties. 24 Indonesia, which is not party to
the Convention, applies the treaty principles in its military manual. 25
Furthermore, the ENMOD rule has been included in the Guidelines on the
Protection of the Environment in Times of Armed Conflict, a document
that the United Nations General Assembly invited all States to disseminate
widely. 26 The U.S. stated the Convention reflected "the international
community's consensus that the environment itself should not be used as
27
an instrument of war."27 State practice
has also supported this.28 In
addition, during a debate at the meeting of the General Assembly's Sixth
Committee in 1991, Sweden referred to the destruction of the environment
by the Iraqi forces in the First Gulf War as being "an unacceptable form of,
warfare in the future."2 9 Canada supported this view, stating that "the
environment as such should not form the object of direct attack." 30
Regardless of whether the ENMOD provisions have achieved
official customary status, a general consensus exists against the use of the
environment as a weapon. 31
B. AdditionalProtocolI 1977
Additional Protocol 1 1977 to the Geneva Convention of 1949 also
came into force in 1977.32 As with the ENMOD Convention, these rules
were inspired by the environmental devastation of the Vietnam War. The

24

JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, I CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN
LAW 155 (Cambridge University Press 2005).
25
26

d
d

27 id

28
29

See PENAL CODE § 104 (2001) (Est.).

30

id

HENcKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 24, at
156.

Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating
to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), art. 51, 4(c), June
8, 1977, available at
http://www.un.org/children/conflict/keydocuments/english/genevaconvention4.html
[hereinafter Protocol 1].
32
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Protocol provides direct protection for the environment during armed
conflict in two provisions.
Article 35(3) prohibits state parties to use methods or means of
warfare causing "widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural
environment." 34 This Article deals with situations in which "damage to the
natural environment is produced by the intentional [use] of method[s] or
means of warfare" and where such consequences are foreseeable. 35
The second provision builds on this. Article 55(1) provides that:
Care shall be taken in warfare to protect the natural
environment against widespread, long-term and severe
damage. This protection includes a prohibition of the use of
methods or means of warfare which are intended or may be
expected to cause such damage to the natural environment
and thereby to prejudice the health and survival of the
population. 36
This Article is a governing principle that requires that the effects or
repercussions of permitted actions do not result in escalating or otherwise
producing the prohibited "widespread, long-term and severe damage to the
natural environment." 37 Article 55(2) further stipulates the protection by
prohibiting attacks against the natural environment by way of retaliation
against enemies. 38
These provisions are binding on states parties to the Protocol.3 9
is unclear, however, whether these provisions are considered to be part of
customary international law. There is ample evidence showing that it has
reached customary international law status, as causing such damage to the
environment has been expressly prohibited in many state military

33
34

id.

Id.; Cohan, supra note 18, at 502.
Cohan, supra note 18, at 503-04.
36 Id.
at 502.
3

7

38
3

Id. at 504.
Protocol I, supra note 32, art. 55(2).
See Protocol I, supra note 32.
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manuals 40 and legislated as an offense in a number of states. 4 1 Before the
ICJ in the Nuclear Weapons Cases, states argued that they considered
Articles 35(3) and 55 to be customary, and that any party to a conflict
must observe them, "or must avoid using methods or means of warfare
that would destroy or could have disastrous effects on the environment."4 2
The United States also stated that "US practice does not involve methods
of warfare that would constitute widespread, long-term and severe damage
to the environment." 43 The three criteria in Article 35(3) were also
reflected in the war crimes provisions of the Rome Statute.4 4
There is also considerable practice negating the customary status
of these Protocol provisions. In the Nuclear Weapons case, the United
Kingdom and the United States both argued against the customary status
of the Articles and the Court itself appeared to consider the rule not being
of customary law.45 Furthermore, the Final Report of the Committee
Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia stated that Article 55 of Additional Protocol I
"may ... reflect current customary law." 46
A major difficulty in establishing the customary status of these
Protocol provisions are the positions of France, the United Kingdom, and
the United States.4 7 They have persistently objected to these rules forming
customary law as they apply to nuclear weapons.4 8 Each state has
indicated through military manuals or reservations to the Protocol upon
ratification that the rules apply to them only in regards to conventional
These states include: Argentina, Australia, Canada, Germany
Kenya, New Zealand,
Russia, Togo, United Kingdom, and the United States. HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK,
supra note 24, at 152, n.52.
41 These states include: Australia, Azerbaijan, Belarus,
Canada, Congo, Croatia,
Germany, Netherlands, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. HENCKAERTS &
DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 24, at 152, n.53.
42
Id. at 152.
43
Id. at 153.
"4See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 8, T 2(b)(iv), openedfor
signatureJuly 17, 1998, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9th [hereinafter Rome Statute].
45 HENCKAERTS &DoSWALD-BECK, supranote 24, at 153-54.
46Id. at 154.
40

48 d
47

d
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weapons, but not nuclear weapons. 49 It seems most likely therefore that
the position of the ICRC in the Study on Customary International
Humanitarian Law is the correct approach. It concluded that in light of
such statements and practice, Article 35(3) and 55 are of customary nature
only in regards to conventional weapons, but not nuclear weapons. 50
C. Comparingand ContrastingENMOD andAdditionalProtocolI
ENMOD and Additional Protocol I have different applications,
purposes, and thresholds, with no substantive overlap. Additional Protocol
I focuses on the natural environment regardless of the weapon used.s' On
the other hand, the ENMOD Convention aims to prevent hostile use of
environmental modification techniques. 52 The Protocol "protects the
environment[,] the 'environment as victim[,'] whereas the ENMOD
Convention protects the manipulation of the environment[,] the
'environment as weapon[. ']53 Furthermore, the Protocol protects the
environment from unintentional and incidental damage while the ENMOD
Convention only protects against deliberate damage inflicted during the
course of warfare.54
Second, the threshold of the two treaties differs.5 5 The Protocol
takes a cumulative approach, requiring a "widespread, long-term, and
severe" effect on the environment. 56 The ENMOD Convention, however,
requires only that the affect on the environment be "widespread, longterm, or severe." 57 The Convention therefore has a broader application.
Third, the two treaties apply different meanings to the three
threshold requirements, requiring that the affect on the environment be

49

d

' 0Id. at 154.
51 See Protocol I, supranote
32.
52

Philippe Antoine, InternationalHumanitarianLaw and the Protectionof the

Environment in Time ofArmed Conflict, in A MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAWS 184, 192 (Naorem Sanajoaba ed., Regency Publications 2004).
s3 DINSTEIN, supra note 10, at 189.
54 id
55

56 Id.
57

See Protocol I, supra note 32.
ENMOD Convention, supra note 4.
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"widespread, long-term, or severe." The meaning of these terms in the
ENMOD Convention were expanded in an Understanding adopted in 1984
during the Convention's First Review Conference. 8 "Widespread"
referred to a geographic area of several hundred square kilometres; "longlasting" required the effect to last for a period of months, or over a season;
and "severe" meant "serious or significant disruption or harm to human
life, natural and economic resources or other assets." 59 In contrast to the
ENMOD Convention, no definitions for the terms were provided in the
Protocol. Commentaries, however, have stated that it is generally
understood that "widespread" referred to less than several hundred square
kilometres, "long-term" referred to ten years or more, and "severe"
required damage that would be likely to prejudice, over a long term, the
continued survival of the civilian population or would risk causing major
health problems. 60 Such differences in meaning are a reflection of the
distinct purpose, nature, and application of both treaties.
Last, it is important to note that the Protocol applies only during
armed conflict, whereas the ENMOD Convention applies during
peacetime and/or armed conflict.
Despite such differences in these treaties, they are in many ways
complementary by dealing with different areas of the law.
III. INDIRECT TREATY LAW

A number of supplementary provisions provide indirect protection
of the environment during armed conflict.
A. AdditionalProtocolI
Article 51 prohibits indiscriminate attacks, including such attacks
"which employ a method or means of combat the effects of which cannot
be limited as required by this Protocol." 61
58

Chamorro & Hammond, supra note 15.

59 id.

6 Y. Sandoz, C. Swinarski, B. Zimmermann, Commentary on the Additional Protocols of
8 June, 1977, to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August, 1949, at 416-417 (1987). See
Antoine, supra note 52.
6 Protocol I, supra note 32, art. 51, 1 4(c).
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Article 54 protects objects indispensable to the survival of the
civilian population, such as "foodstuffs, agricultural areas for the
production of foodstuffs, crops, livestock, drinking water installations and
supplies and irrigation works." 62
Article 56 provides for the protection of works and installations
containing dangerous forces, in particular "dams, dykes and nuclear
electrical generating stations." 63 These are prohibited as the object of
attack, even when considered military targets if such an attack may cause
the release of dangerous forces and severe losses among the civilian
population." The Article does, however, provide narrow circumstances in
which those named protected sites may legitimately be attacked, such as
when the installations are used in regular, significant, and direct support of
military operations and if such attack is the only feasible way to terminate
such support. 65 This provision was adopted in response to accusations that
during the Vietnam War U.S. forces had attacked dykes in order to induce
catastrophic floods. 66
B. ProtocolIII annexed to the Convention on Conventional Weapons
Article 2(4) states that:
It is prohibited to make forests or other kinds of plant cover
the object of attack by incendiary weapons except when
such natural elements are used to cover, conceal or
camouflage combatants or other military objectives, or are
themselves military objectives. 6 7
This is a very limited provision, applying only to "forests or other kinds of
plant cover" and granting protection not against attacks in general but only
those by incendiary weapons. Furthermore, the protection afforded by the
provision is not available if the enemy utilizes the forest for cover,
62 Id art. 54,
6
1 d art. 56.
6

Id.

6s See

2.

id. art. 56, 1 (2)(a)-(c).

See Antoine, supra note 52, at 193.
67 DINSTEIN, supra note 10, at
187.
6
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concealment or camouflage. 68 Consequently, provided the forest is used in
military operations, it is a legitimate target. Even though this provision has
a very narrow application, it is significant because it protects a specific
portion of the environment from a particular type of weapon.6 9
C. The Chemical Weapons Convention 1993 ("CWC")
The seventh paragraph of the CWC's preamble recognizes the
prohibition of the use of herbicides in warfare, as embodied in agreements
and relevant principles of international law.70 Although the definition of a
chemical weapon 7 under the CWC does not include herbicides, "the
United States has 'formally renounced the first use of herbicides in time of
armed conflict,' except within U.S. installations or around their defensive
perimeters." 72 The reference to the prohibition of herbicides in agreements
is assumed to be an allusion to the ENMOD Convention and Protocol I.73
What is of greater importance however, according to Dinstein, is the
reference to "relevant principles of international law" as this creates an
"inescapable connotation" that the prohibition of herbicide use in armed
conflict is now embodied in customary international law.74
D. Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982
Despite containing no provision expressly protecting the marine
environment against the consequences of an armed conflict, it can be
68

id

E. T. Jensen, The InternationalLaw ofEnvironmental Warfare: Active andPassive
Damage DuringArmed Conflict, 38 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 145, 174 (2005).
70 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,
Production, Stockpiling, and Use
of Bacteriological and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, openedfor signature
Jan. 13, 1993, G.A. Res. 39, pmbl. 7, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/Res/47/39,
32 I.L.M. 800.
id.
72 DINSTEIN, supra note 10, at 188 (quoting ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT TO THE
COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS 477 (A.R. Thomas &
James C. Duncan eds., 1999)).
73 d
71'

74id
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assumed that such protection exists in the context of the provisions with
regard to pollution of the sea. 7 5
E. GeneralStatements
A further protection of the environment can be found in broad
statements issued at international conferences. Principle 21 of the
Stockholm Declaration of 1972 and Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration
1992 express the common conviction of states concerned that they have a
duty "to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not
cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the
limits of national jurisdiction., 7 6
Furthermore, principle 23 of the Rio Declaration states: the
environment and natural resources of people under oppression, domination
and occupation shall be protected.7 7 Principle 24 states:
Warfare is inherently destructive of sustainable development.
States shall therefore respect international law providing
protection for the environment in times of armed conflict and
cooperate in its further development, as necessary.
These statements are "a clear challenge for those States willing to
embrace" them, and are often "quoted as authority for requiring
compliance with various peacetime environmental rules during armed
conflict."79

7 THE HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF VISITING FORCES

University Press 2001).

268 (Dieter Fleck ed.,

Oxford

United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, Braz.,
June 3-14, 1992, Rio Declarationon Environment andDevelopment, Principle 2, U.N.
Doc A/CONF. 151/26 (June 13, 1992) [hereinafter Rio Declaration]; United Nations
Conference on Human Environment, Stockholm, Swed., June 5-16, 1972, Declarationof
the UnitedNations Conference on the Human Environment, Principle 21, U.N. Doc
A/CONF.48/14 (June 16, 1972) [hereinafter Stockholm Declaration].
7 Rio Declaration, supra note 76, Principle 23.
78 Rio Declaration, supra note 76, Principle 24.
7 Jensen, supra note 69, at 163.
76
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The ICJ in the Nuclear Weapons Case made special note of the UN
General Assembly Resolution on the Protection of the Environment in
Times of Armed Conflict,8 0 thereby affirming that environmental
considerations must be taken into account in implementing the principles
of law applicable in armed conflict. 8 ' The Resolution also upholds that
"destruction of the environment, not justified by military necessity and
carried out wantonly, is clearly contrary to existing international law." 82
These various conventions, conference statements and judicial
rulings are a source of indirect protection for the environment. They
provide a further extension of the directly applicable law laid out in the
ENMOD Convention and the Additional Protocol I.

IV.

ENFORCEMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION

A. Existing Mechanisms
The existing enforcement mechanisms are primarily concerned
with issues of state responsibility. Under the Additional Protocol I, Article
90 provides for the establishment of an international fact-finding
commission with the ability to inquire into serious violations of the
Geneva Conventions and the Protocol in order to facilitate restoration of
the respect for the Conventions and Protocol. 83 The commission has,
however, never been utilized largely because of a lack of support from
state parties. 84
Despite the ENMOD Convention not having any enforcement or
remedial mechanisms, a possible means for resolution of disputes arising
out of the Convention is for a state to make a formal complaint before the
UN Security Council, which can in turn investigate and issue a report
condemning the matter.
Although Iraq and Kuwait were not state parties to the ENMOD
Convention, the environmental damage committed by Iraq during the First
80 Advisory
81Id.
82

Opinion, supra note 1.

d

Protocol I, supranote 32, art. 90, 2(c).
8 P. K. Rakate & N. D. McDonald, Desperate Measures? The Protectionof the
Environment through the Law ofArmed Conflict, 26 SAYIL 141 (2001).
83
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Gulf War was addressed by the United Nations Security Council.85 Iraq
"had deliberately spilled between seven and nine million barrels of
[Kuwaiti] oil into the Persian Gulf and set 508 oil well heads ablaze, 82 of
which were damaged in a manner that caused oil to freely flow from
them." 86 In Resolution 687, the Security Council held Iraq liable for "any
direct loss, damage, including environmental damage, and the depletion of
natural resources" inflicted during the invasion of Kuwait.87 The
delegates, despite agreeing that international law was applicable, were
unable to agree which law should apply.8 8 The UN Compensation
Commission was then established by the Security Council to administer
any claims against Iraq. 89 Resolution 687 sets the precedent for future
wars and acts as a deterrent for states, forcing states to take environmental
factors seriously when engaging in armed conflict. 90
A further existing machinery is the International Court of Justice.
Relying on the si omnes clause, which provides for "respect and ensuring
respect for" Geneva Law, commentators such as Rakate and McDonald
argue that it could be construed as giving any third state an interest in
environmental damage done durinp armed conflict, thereby broadening the
scope of liability for offenders. Utilizing such judicial mechanisms
would strengthen the existing provisions.
B. Individual CriminalResponsibility
Article 8(2)(b)(iv) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court ("ICC") includes as a war crime:
Intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that
such attack will cause ... widespread, long-term and severe
damage to the natural environment which would be clearly
S.C. Res. 687, pmbl. 8, U.N. Doc S/RES/687 (April 3, 1991).
Michael N. Schmidt, HumanitarianLaw and the Environment, 28 DENV. J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y 265, 269 (2000).
8 S.C. Res. 687,
16, U.N. Doc S/RES/687 (April 3, 1991).
88 See Cohan, supra note 18,
at 520-21.
89 S.C. Res. 687,
18, U.N. Doc S/RES/687 (April 3, 1991).
9 Id. at 488-89.
91 See Rakate & McDonald, supra note 84, at 141.
8s

86
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excessive in relation to concrete and direct overall military
advantage anticipated. 92
Although much of this provision is modelled after Article 35(3) Additional
Protocol I, there are a number of important differences which further limit
the application of the ICC's provision. First, the statute requires both
intention and knowledge of the outcome, instead of either intention or
expectation as required by the Protocol. 93 This is an expected requirement
as the crime is concerned with individual criminal responsibility. The
mens rea of intent and knowledge must be proven, which, coupled with
the subjectivity of the prohibition, would make the prosecution quite
difficult. 94 Second, "the damage to the natural environment must be
clearly excessive in relation to the military advantage anticipated."9 5 This
requires a consideration of the international humanitarian law principle of
proportionality in which a balance must be struck between the military
advantage anticipated and the damage to the natural environment as a
civilian object, unless an element of the environment, such as a forest, is
considered to be a military objective. 96 This provision has the same
difficulty as the Protocol in that it could prove very difficult to substantiate
that the three required criteria of "widespread, long-term and severe
damage" have been met.97
C. NationalImplementation
Arguably, the most effective means of addressing the protection of
the environment during armed conflict is through the national
implementation of such rules. International non-governmental
organizations, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross
("ICRC") and Green Cross International, have made proposals for
implementing existing international humanitarian law through military
92 Rome Statute, supra note 44, art. 8,

2(b)(iv).

9 See DINSTEIN, supranote 10, at 178.
94

See Rakate & McDonald, supra note 84, at 141.

9s DINsTEIN, supra note 10, at 186.
96
97

id.
id.
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manuals of the armed forces.9 8 Green Cross International has advocated
the dangers the environment faces including during armed conflict and
argued that a 'culture of compliance' with humanitarian law is the best
hope of its successful implementation. 99 It is far more effective if states
themselves change their attitude and approach towards the environment,
rather than ex postfacto condemnation, political pressure, and prosecution
of violations. 100

V. CONCLUSION
The demands of protecting our fragile environment will be one of
the greatest challenges our society will meet in the coming centuries. The
needs of the natural world must be considered in all aspects of human
activity, including armed conflict and national security. These are not
always competing interests, and in many ways are complementary and
inter-dependent. Nevertheless, a fair balance must be drawn between the
reality of military necessity and the need to ensure the survival of the
human race and the other forms of life entrusted to us. The numerous
conventions, protocols, conference statements, and resolutions provide a
starting point for drawing the limits of armed conflict. However, if we are
to seriously address environmental protection, it must come from a
genuine desire within each individual State to actively ensure compliance
with the rules of war as they relate to safeguarding the planet.

See Rakate & McDonald, supra note 84, at 142.
1d. at 142-143.
'" Id. at 143.
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